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SUPERVISING CYBERSPACE: A SIMPLE 
THRESHOLD FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL 
JURISDICTION OVER STUDENTS’  
ONLINE ACTIVITY 
Abstract: This Note addresses the much-debated problem of identifying 
and limiting the authority that a public elementary or secondary school 
has over the online expression of its students. In recent years, there have 
been an increasing number of First Amendment lawsuits brought against 
schools by students whom the schools disciplined for their online expres-
sion. This Note proposes that, before engaging in a First Amendment 
analysis of the student’s expression, courts engage in a threshold inquiry 
to determine whether a school has any authority to discipline a student 
for the expression at issue. This Note argues that courts should apply a 
“control and supervision” test, derived from the analysis used in negligent 
supervision cases and Title IX cases for student-on-student sexual harass-
ment, to determine whether a school has the authority to discipline a stu-
dent for his or her online speech. 
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the 
power of government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from 
schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, 
they take with them in life.1 
Introduction 
 In April 2007, administrators at Lewis S. Mills High School, a pub-
lic school in Burlington, Connecticut, punished Avery Doninger, a jun-
ior, for using an online blog to criticize her school administration’s 
management of a student battle-of-the-bands event that she had organ-
ized as junior class secretary.2 In the blog, which she created and used 
                                                                                                                      
1 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385−86 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
2 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 202, 206 (D. Conn. 2007) (denying stu-
dent’s motion for preliminary injunction and holding that she did not have a First 
Amendment right to run for student council office while engaging in offensive speech 
about school administrators in her blog), aff’d 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 595 F. 
Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 2009) (granting summary judgment to the school on the student’s 
blog entry First Amendment claim, and denying summary judgment to the school on the 
student’s First Amendment claim concerning the school’s censorship of “Team Avery” t-shirts 
that students were prohibited from wearing at the school’s election assembly), certifying 
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only from home, Doninger wrote that the superintendent “got pissed 
off,” characterized the administrators as “douchebags,” and used other 
offensive language.3 The school responded by prohibiting Doninger 
from running for senior class secretary.4 Doninger sued the school in 
July 2007 for violating her First Amendment right to free speech, seek-
ing damages and an injunction preventing the school from enforcing 
her punishment.5 This case presented the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Connecticut with the difficult task of assessing whether the 
school’s action was a reasonable exercise of the school’s disciplinary 
authority or an infringement of Avery Doninger’s First Amendment 
right to free speech.6 
 This Note seeks to establish a test for determining when a school 
has jurisdiction over its students’ online expressions.7 Legislators, pub-
lic school administrators, teachers, and parents increasingly are con-
cerned with student speech on the Internet and the effect it may have 
on a school’s ability to maintain a controlled and constructive learning 
environment.8 The kinds of online speech that public schools have 
                                                                                                                      
questions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49908 (D. Conn. 
May 14, 2009) (holding that there was a question of law for appeal of whether the school’s dis-
cipline of Doninger in response to her blog entry violated the First Amendment, and whether 
the school was entitled to qualified immunity on both First Amendment claims). Doninger’s 
blog was available at www.livejournal.com, and her privacy setting at the time she wrote the blog 
was “public” so that anyone could view the webpage. Id. at 206; see also David Hudson, Judge 
Rejects Student’s Blog Claim, Allows T-shirt Issue to Proceed, First Amendment Center, Jan. 20, 
2009, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=21133. 
3 See Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 206. The court quoted her exact language as: 
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. . . . basically, because 
we sent [the original Jamfest email] out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of 
phone calls and emails and such. . . . however, she got pissed off and decided 
to just cancel the whole thing all together, anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t 
going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we do[,] it is going to be af-
ter the talent show on may 18th. 
Id. (alterations and omissions in original). Paula Schwartz was the superintendent. 
4 See id. at 202. 
5 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D. Conn. 2009); Doninger, 514 F. 
Supp. 2d at 202, 210. 
6 See Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
7 U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”); see Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 210. The First Amendment is incorporated 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
8 See Tresa Baldas, “Cyberbullying” Creates Legal Quandary, 18 Fulton County Daily Rep. 
(Ga.), No. 240, Dec. 11, 2007; Anne Marie Chaker, Schools Act to Short-Circuit Spread of “Cyber-
bullying,” Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 2007, at D1; Alan Gomez, Students, Officials Locking Horns over 
Blogs, USA Today, Oct. 26, 2006, at 8D; Cynthia Wagner, Beating the Cyberbullies, Futurist, 
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tried to curb include politically unpopular speech,9 parodies of 
teachers or administrators,10 and “cyberbullying.”11 In particular, as 
student use of the Internet grows, cyberbullying—or online threats, 
harassment, and ridicule by students of their peers and teachers—is 
becoming increasingly prevalent.12 Messages and pictures on the Inter-
net are potentially more disruptive than messages sent by traditional 
media because the Internet distributes this information to a huge audi-
                                                                                                                      
Sept. 1, 2008, at 14 available at http://www.allbusiness.com/technology/software-services- 
applications-internet-social/11579506–1.html. 
9 See Rob Rogers, Redwood High Student Says He Was Suspended for Conservative Paper, 
Marin Indep. J. (Cal.), Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://www.marinij.com/larkspur 
cortemadera/ci_10859909. An example of punishment for political speech is the case of 
seventeen-year-old Cyrus Massoumi, who was suspended for five days from Redwood High 
School in Larkspur, California in 2008 for distributing flyers at school directing students to 
his online newsletter and for emailing the newsletter to school faculty. Id. His newsletter 
critiqued the liberal politics of Massoumi’s town and included satirical articles about envi-
ronmentalists, Israel, gay-rights activists, women, and the residents of his county. Id. 
10 See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007); 
Beidler v. N. Thurston Sch. Dist., No. 99-2-00236-6, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 18, 
2000); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Wash. State, Student Gets Damages in Web Parody 
Case (Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.aclu-wa.org/detail.cfm?id=169. 
11 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591; J.S. v. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002); 
Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus 
Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 257, 257−58 (2008); Renee L. Servance, Comment, 
Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 
Wis. L. Rev. 1213, 1218−19. Bullying has become a prevalent problem in schools, causing 
schools to take online bullying very seriously. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Crime, 
Violence, Discipline, and Safety in U.S. Public Schools Findings from the School 
Survey on Crime and Safety: 2005−06, at 9 (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/ 
pubs2007/2007361.pdf [hereinafter Education Statistics 2005–06]. 
12 See CARAVAN Opinion Research Corp., Cyberbullying Teen 3 (2006), available at 
http://fightcrime.org/cyberbullying/cyberbullyingteen.pdf [hereinafter Caravan Teen]; 
Amanda Lenhart, Cyberbullying and Online Teens 1 (June 27, 2007) available at http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/216/report_display.asp; Nat’l Assoc. of Att’ys Gen., Campus 
Safety Task Force: 2007 Report and Recommendations 3 (2007), available at http://www. 
naag.org/assets/files/pdf/2007.TaskForceOnSchoolAndCampusSafety.pdf (emphasizing that 
the “growth in the use of technology and social networking sites by younger Americans has 
fueled a fear among professionals that cyberbullying will become the means most often util-
ized to harass, threaten or otherwise cause distress,” and that it is imperative that schools 
address cyberbullying by students). 
Between 2001 and 2006, the percent of young people in the U.S. between the ages of 
twelve and seventeen that had Internet access at home rose from 73% to 87%. Amanda 
Lenhart et al., Teens and the Internet: Findings Submitted to the House Energy 
and Commerce Telecommunications Subcommittee 2 ( July 11, 2006), available at http:// 
www.pewinternet.org (search “teens and the internet house telecom”); Amanda Lenhart 
et al., Teenage Life Online: The Rise of the Instant Message Generation and the 
Internet’s Impact on Friendships and Family Relationships 3 ( June 21, 2001), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/36/report_display.asp. 
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ence in a short amount of time.13 Because the lives of elementary and 
secondary school students often revolve around the school, the effects 
of online student activity at home frequently are brought to school 
through cell phones, print-outs, and school computers.14 
 An increase in school violence and a number of highly publicized 
student suicides have highlighted the problem of abusive online activity 
by students and put pressure on legislatures and school officials to pass 
tougher laws and implement stricter discipline policies to punish cy-
berbullying.15 School law has been developing rapidly in response to 
this social pressure.16 At least fifteen states now have legislation requir-
ing schools to establish policies on controlling cyberbullying.17 Some of 
these policies, however, do not adequately guide schools on when 
schools have jurisdiction over students’ online activity.18 In order for 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (“An email can be sent to dozens or hundreds of 
other students by hitting ‘send.’ A blog entry . . . can be instantaneously viewed by 
students, teachers, and administrators alike. Off-campus speech can become on-campus 
speech with the click of a mouse.”). 
14 See id.; Erb, supra note 11, at 258. 
15 See Baldas, supra note 8; Chaker, supra note 8; Gomez, supra note 8; Wagner, supra note 
8. For information about increased school violence, see William D. Valente & Christina M. 
Valente, Law in the Schools 5–6 (6th ed. 2005). From 1997 to 2005, the number of schools 
reporting at least one incident of serious violent crime rose from 10% to 17.1%. Education 
Statistics 2005–06, supra note 11, at 5 (defining serious violent crime as rape or other type of 
sexual battery, physical attack or fight with a weapon, or robbery); Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Sta-
tistics, Crime, Violence and Discipline Problems in U.S. Public Schools: 1996–97 iv 
(1998), http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=98030 (defining serious violent 
crime as rape or other type of sexual battery, murder, suicide, physical attack or fight with a 
weapon, or robbery). 
For information about student suicides, see Todd Jurkowski, Bullying Moves from School 
to Cyberspace, NBC2 News, Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.nbc-2.com/articles/readarticle.asp? 
articleid=4827&z=3&p (reporting that in June 2005, a fifteen-year-old hanged himself after 
enduring severe bullying at school and online over the course of almost three years), and 
Make a Difference for Kids, Inc., http://www.MakeaDifferenceForKids.org (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2009) (website dedicated to promoting awareness and prevention of cyberbullying 
and suicide). 
16 See infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
17 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 20-30-5.5 (2008); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 339.351–.364 (2007); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.300.285 (West 1961 & Supp. 2009). Arkansas, California, Idaho, 
Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, New York, Vermont, Florida, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Utah, Indiana, and Washington have cyberbullying legislation or policies in place. Kath-
leen Conn & Kevin P. Brady, MySpace and Its Relatives: The Cyberbullying Dilemma, 226 Ed. Law 
Rep. 1, 6 (2008); CyberBullyAlert.com, Cyberbullying State Laws and Policies (Oct. 8, 2008), 
http://www.cyberbullyalert.com/blog/2008/10/cyber-bullying-state-laws-and-policies. 
18 See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.300.285. For example, the Washington statute does 
not distinguish between on- and off-campus cyberbullying. Id. Arkansas law also allows 
school officials to take action against cyberbullies even if the bullying did not originate or 
take place on school property. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514 (West 2009). In contrast, the 
 
2009] Public School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity 1567 
schools to draft appropriate policies in compliance with cyberbullying 
statutes, school officials need clarity on the boundaries of their author-
ity over online activity and the extent to which the First Amendment 
protects students’ online expression.19 
 In addition to new laws and societal pressure, there are a number 
of other legal reasons why schools are becoming more involved with 
students’ online expression.20 First, the limits on school jurisdiction 
over students’ online activity are undeveloped.21 Although it is well es-
tablished by forty years of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that public 
school students retain a First Amendment right to free speech while at 
school, that right is more limited than speech rights in a public forum 
because of the school’s interest in maintaining an orderly and produc-
tive learning environment.22 As a result, student speech rights under 
the First Amendment have developed as a separate analysis from the 
more general First Amendment speech jurisprudence that applies to 
speech in a public forum.23 
 Currently, lower courts differ on when school speech standards 
rather than general First Amendment principles govern in online stu-
dent speech cases.24 Courts and commentators also debate whether 
schools should be involved at all in regulating online speech created off 
school property, regardless of the standard used, general or student-
                                                                                                                      
Oregon statute limits the school’s policy to addressing harassment that takes place on 
campus or at a school-sponsored event. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 339.351–.364. 
19 See Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 
20 See infra notes 22−36 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 108–162 and accompanying text. 
22 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681–83 
(1986) (stating that the school’s responsibility to teach fundamental values such as toler-
ance of different viewpoints must be considered in light of the school’s need to protect the 
“sensibilities” of other students and the potential damage lewd speech that could cause to 
an immature and developing mind); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969); Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 595. Conditions in the school envi-
ronment potentially justify constraining student speech: 
[S]tudents and teachers cannot easily disassociate themselves from expres-
sions directed towards them on school property and during school hours, be-
cause disciplinary problems in such a populated and concentrated setting se-
riously sap the educational processes, and because High School teachers and 
administrators have the vital responsibility of compressing a variety of subjects 
and activities into a relatively confined period of time and space . . . . 
Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968−69 (5th Cir. 1972). 
23 See infra notes 42–80 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 108–150 and accompanying text. 
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specific.25 The difficulty with applying traditional school speech juris-
prudence to online speech is that “Internet content is not limited by 
geography,” and thus a “geographical distinction is no longer a logical 
border to school jurisdiction over student speech.”26 The current un-
predictability in online student speech case law has resulted in a lack of 
fair notice to students, a potential chilling of student Internet use and 
expression, and, of course, a plethora of litigation.27 
 As a result of the uncertainty in this area of the law, schools can 
regulate online speech liberally and without the fear of paying damages 
for a First Amendment violation because, even if a school official vio-
lates a student’s speech rights, the official will be granted qualified im-
munity from monetary damages if the disciplinary action was “objec-
tively reasonable in light of ‘clearly established’ law at the time of the 
violation.”28 Because of the courts’ inconsistent approaches to online 
student speech, schools disciplining such speech often have a compel-
ling argument that no “clearly established” law existed to guide their 
policy.29 As a result, the school can be seen to have acted reasonably 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Sherry Saavedra, Schools Weigh Control Versus First Amendment, San Diego Union-
Trib., June 4, 2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060604/news_1n4my- 
space.html. For example, Peter Scheer, executive director of the California First Amendment 
Coalition, said “[m]y own view is that it can be the school’s business if the speech on 
MySpace is especially offensive or dangerous.” Id. In contrast, David Blair-Loy, legal 
director of the San Diego and Imperial Counties chapter of the ACLU, is of the opinion 
that schools do not have the right to discipline students for off-campus speech unless the 
student broke a school rule. Id. See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in 
the Digital Age, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1027 (2008) (arguing that student Internet speech should 
be entirely outside of the school’s control). 
26 Servance, supra note 11, at 1235–36. 
27 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that obscenity should be protected by the First Amendment because of the risk 
that an unsettled standard for defining obscenity would result in the lack of fair notice, the 
chilling of protected speech, and a heavy burden on the state and “federal judicial ma-
chinery.”). See generally Student Press Law Ctr., Guide to Maintaining an Off-Campus 
Web Site (2008), http://www.splc.org/pdf/websitelegalguide.pdf. 
28 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chiu v. 
Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 400 n.1 (failing to hold on the issue of qualified immunity in this situation, 
but implicitly agreeing with Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion that school officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages in First Amendment cases where the 
school acted reasonably in interpreting the existing law); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 
322 (1975). 
29 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 614; Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 218 (granting qualified 
immunity to school defendants because “the constitutional right at stake was not clearly 
established at the time the alleged [First Amendment] violation occurred.”). In Doninger, the 
U.S. District Court of Connecticut stated: “If courts and legal scholars cannot discern the 
contours of First Amendment protections for student internet speech, then it is certainly 
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under a great variety of circumstances.30 Thus, a clear method for 
analysis is necessary to provide guidance to students, courts, and ad-
ministrators.31 This clarification would also diminish the risk of chilling 
student speech by giving notice to students of exactly what activity will 
be free from school interference.32 
 Furthermore, public school officials are presented with a legal 
quandary when deciding whether to discipline a student for online ac-
tivity.33 On one hand, if schools discipline students for speech that 
originated off campus on the student’s home computer, the school may 
be liable for a First Amendment violation.34 On the other hand, if a 
school does not take action against peer harassment or threats, and a 
serious incident results, the school may be liable under federal statutes 
like Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, or a state tort law 
for negligent supervision.35 Schools have relied on the latter concern to 
justify punishing or censoring student speech.36 
 This Note attempts to delineate the outer boundary of public 
elementary and secondary schools’ jurisidiction over their students’ 
online expression.37 Part I summarizes the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
                                                                                                                      
unreasonable to expect school administrators . . . to predict where the line between on- and 
off-campus speech will be drawn in this new digital era.” Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 220. 
30 See supra note 29. 
31 See Tracy Adamovich, Return to Sender: Off-Campus Student Speech Brought On-Campus 
By Another Student, 82 St. John’s L. Rev. 1087, 1096 (2008) (“The lack of a clear guideline, 
even for those supposedly using a similar standard, produces unfairness and a lack of uni-
formity across jurisdictions.”). 
32 See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Adamovich, supra 
note 31, at 1096. 
33 See Conn & Brady, supra note 17, at 2; Servance, supra note 11, at 1215; Baldas, supra 
note 8. See generally Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: Does Title IX or the First 
Amendment Apply?, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 905 (2001); Thomas E. Wheeler II, Slamming in Cyber-
space: The Boundaries of Student First Amendment Rights, 47 Res Gestae 24 (2004). 
34 See infra notes 108−162 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 163–202 and accompanying text. 
36 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 398–99; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 264−66 (noting school’s concern 
about libel or invasion of privacy actions by the parents or students mentioned in the arti-
cles); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686; LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2001). 
37 See Beidler, No. 99-2-00236-6, slip op. at 3. Even with the appropriate standard for de-
termining when the school-speech jurisprudence should be applied, there remain many 
unanswered questions about the correct way to apply those standards. See infra notes 
108−139. There is considerable diversity in what courts have considered a “substantial and 
material disruption” under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. See Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 512−13; infra notes 108−139. There are also differing interpretations of the Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Morse v. Frederick decisions. See infra notes 59, 77 and ac-
companying text. Compare Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 
2007), and Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2007) (both 
cases broadly interpreting Morse as giving schools authority to regulate any speech it thinks 
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dence regarding student speech.38 Part II analyzes the various standards 
relied upon by lower courts in off-campus and online student speech 
cases in the absence of a clear Supreme Court directive on the issue.39 
Part III examines the principles used to limit school responsibility for 
student injury in non-speech contexts under the Title IX action for 
student-on-student sexual harassment and under the tort for negligent 
supervision.40 Part IV proposes that courts use the well-established tem-
poral control and supervision test used in school liability cases to de-
lineate school jurisdiction over online speech.41 
I. Supreme Court Student Speech Jurisprudence 
 Four seminal decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court determine 
when school officials may discipline a public school student for his or 
her expression.42 These cases provide less First Amendment protection 
for students in public schools and establish that certain kinds of student 
speech are never permissible in school.43 The standards established by 
these cases allow greater restriction of expression than the general First 
Amendment standards that apply to speech in public forums.44 Gener-
ally, when the government suppresses speech in a public forum, a court 
will apply strict scrutiny to the government’s action, and will only up-
hold a restriction if there is a compelling governmental interest in the 
suppression of the speech.45 The Supreme Court has held, however, 
that even in a public forum, certain kinds of speech, such as obscenity, 
incitement, and libel, are outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment.46 
                                                                                                                      
may be harmful to students, such as threats), with Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48 (interpreting Morse 
as only allowing school authority over speech that promotes illegal drug use). 
38 See infra notes 42–80 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 81–162 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 163–202 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 203–273 and accompanying text. 
42 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
43 See infra notes 42–80 and accompanying text. 
44 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
45 See id. 
46 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36−37 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1964). 
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A. The Foundation: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District 
 In 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
the U.S. Supreme Court first established that students retain their First 
Amendment free speech right in school.47 This right is a qualified one: 
the Court held that a school may censor student speech that causes a 
material and substantial disruption in the school environment or in-
fringes on the rights of others.48 This limit on students’ freedom of 
speech is justified because schools have an obligation to provide a safe, 
productive, and respectful learning environment.49 Using this modified 
First Amendment test, the Tinker Court reversed the decision by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and held that a high 
school’s suspension of students for wearing black armbands in protest 
of the Vietnam War violated the students’ First Amendment rights.50 
The Court reasoned that the armbands did not cause a substantial dis-
ruption to the school’s operations or infringe on the rights of others.51 
 The material and substantial disruption test in Tinker put a consid-
erable burden on school administrators to justify their disciplinary ac-
tions and, as a result, was seen as a great expansion of student speech 
rights.52 In order to regulate speech, the school must show that the 
speech did in fact cause a substantial disruption or that it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that the speech would cause such disruption.53 If the 
                                                                                                                      
47 393 U.S. at 506, 512–13. The Court famously stated: “It can hardly be argued that ei-
ther students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate.” Id. at 506. The Court continued: 
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during 
the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial sub-
jects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without “materially and sub-
stantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school” and without colliding with the rights of others. 
Id. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
48 Id. Despite the reference to two distinct tests in Tinker, most courts have adopted the 
“material and substantial disruption” test, and not the “rights of others” test. See infra notes 
113–139. 
49 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 
1283 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
50 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 510. 
51 See id. The school argued that it did not want to be associated with anti-war demon-
strations. Id. at 509 n.3. 
52 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 416, 420–21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (lamenting that the ma-
jority in Tinker had expanded student speech rights “well beyond traditional bounds”); 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
53 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
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school argues that a disruption was foreseeable, then Tinker requires 
school officials to show that the speech restriction was necessary to 
avoid that disruption.54 Moreover, it is not permissible to punish speech 
because of an unspecified fear that the speech might cause a distur-
bance, because administrators do not agree with the opinion ex-
pressed, or because the speech is unpleasant or unpopular.55 Finally, 
the Court expressly limited the application of this standard to speech 
that occurs on campus and during school hours.56 Whether Tinker ap-
plies to online speech is an unresolved question that has been ap-
proached in a variety of ways.57 
B. Restrictions on Student Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
 In 1986, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the U.S. Supreme 
Court broadened school authority and opened the door to content-
based restrictions on student speech.58 In Fraser the Court departed 
from Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test, and instead held that a 
school may prohibit students from using “lewd, indecent, or offensive 
speech and conduct,” particularly when other students are a captive 
audience, such as at a mandatory school assembly.59 Applying this 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 511. 
55 See id. at 508, 509, 511. The Court stated that students “may not be confined to the 
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. . . . [S]chool officials cannot 
suppress ‘expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.’” Id. at 511. The 
Court also stated: 
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of 
a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 
Id. at 509. 
56 See id. at 512–13. 
57 See infra notes 108–162 and accompanying text. 
58 See 478 U.S. at 685. Fraser has been interpreted both narrowly and broadly by lower 
courts. Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of 
Student Cyberspeech, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 835, 846 n.41 (2008). Some courts interpret 
Fraser as giving authority to school administrators to regulate any speech they find offen-
sive. See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000); Chan-
dler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). Other courts have inter-
preted Fraser more narrowly as only applying to sexually offensive language. See, e.g., Nixon 
v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that 
politically offensive speech must instead be analyzed under Tinker). 
59 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 683, 685–86; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Fraser has been criti-
cized by commentators for greatly limiting student speech rights and reverting to a time 
when schools had the authority to regulate any student speech, regardless of its level of 
disruption on the school. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 58, at 840 n.26, 841 (citing 
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analysis, the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and held constitutional a school’s discipline of a high school 
student who had used a sexually explicit metaphor to discuss his 
friend’s candidacy for student council in a speech at a school assem-
bly.60 Because the student’s speech was lewd and offensive, the school 
did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights by suspending 
him and prohibiting him from speaking at graduation.61 
 The Court used language susceptible to broad interpretation by 
stating that schools may regulate speech that “is wholly inconsistent 
with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education,” or that 
“would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”62 The Court 
based such broad school authority on the concept that the school 
stands in loco parentis to the students, and therefore has an interest in, 
and obligation to, protect students from indecent speech.63 The Court 
also emphasized that the school cannot be forced to tolerate speech 
that other students or teachers might interpret as being endorsed by 
the school.64 In reaction to the potentially broad authority given to 
schools in Fraser, Justice Brennan wrote separately to explicitly limit the 
decision’s application to speech issued on school grounds.65 
                                                                                                                      
David L. Hudson & John E. Ferguson, The Courts’ Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser 
and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 181, 183 (2002); Royal C. 
Gardner, III, Note, Protecting a School’s Interest in Value Inculcation to the Detriment of Students’ 
Free Expression Rights: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 28 B.C. L. Rev. 595, 624 (1987); 
Therese Thibodeaux, Note, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The Supreme Court 
Supports School in Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech, 33 Loy. L. Rev. 516, 
525−26 (1987)). 
60 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. The speech elicited obscene gestures and jeering from 
the students in the crowd and teachers canceled classes to discuss the incident with stu-
dents. Id. at 678. 
61 See id. at 685–86. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 684; infra note 167. 
64 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. The Court in Fraser quoted Justice Black’s dissent in 
Tinker: “I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitu-
tion compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the 
American public school system to public school students.” Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
65 See id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If respondent had given the same speech 
outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because gov-
ernment officials considered his language to be inappropriate; the Court’s opinion does 
not suggest otherwise.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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C. Further Limiting Student Speech: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
 In 1988, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the U.S. Supreme 
Court continued to cut away at the stringent Tinker rule by specifying 
yet another kind of student speech that schools may regulate.66 The 
Court held that when student speech occurs in a school-sponsored me-
dium, such as a school newspaper, and therefore could be attributed to 
the school, the school may regulate that speech as long as its actions are 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”67 The school 
need not show any disruption in order to prohibit the speech.68 In 
Kuhlmeier, the staff members of the school newspaper sued the school 
for violating their First Amendment rights after the school prohibited 
publication of certain articles relating to pregnancy, divorce, and birth 
control.69 The Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and 
declared the school’s censorship constitutional.70 The Court distin-
guished between tolerating speech, as in Tinker, and promoting or pub-
lishing student speech, which puts the school’s imprimatur on that 
speech.71 
 Kuhlmeier probably cannot be applied to student websites because 
it requires the speech medium to be school-sponsored.72 It might apply, 
however, where a student uses school technology to create a website, 
posts advertisements at school directing people to a website, or creates 
an ostensibly school-sponsored website, because in these situations it 
appears that the school has endorsed the speech.73 
D. A Third Constraint on Student Speech: Morse v. Frederick 
 In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court created a third content-based 
exception to the stringent Tinker standard in Morse v. Frederick.74 In 
Morse, the Court held that a school’s restriction of speech is justified 
when the speech encourages illegal drug use, even if it does not cause a 
                                                                                                                      
66 See 484 U.S. at 273. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 272–73. 
69 Id. at 262. The school feared that the identities of the students described in the arti-
cles would be revealed and did not want to be responsible for the dissemination of the 
personal information of those families. Id. at 263. 
70 Id. at 270. 
71 See id. at 270–71. 
72 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Jake Tabor, Note, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the 
Age of the Internet: Off-Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 561, 580 (2009). 
73 See Tabor, supra note 72, at 580; Rogers, supra note 9 (discussing the punishment of 
a student who placed the address for his website on posters around the school). 
74 See 551 U.S. at 403. 
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disruption and it is not in a school-sponsored medium.75 In Morse, the 
school suspended a student who unfurled a banner at an off-campus, 
but school-sanctioned, event that read, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”76 The 
Court agreed with school administrators that the banner promoted il-
legal drug use and, reversing the holding of the Ninth Circuit, held 
that the school’s disciplinary action did not violate the student’s First 
Amendment rights because the “special characteristics of the school 
environment” and the strong governmental interest in preventing stu-
dent drug use were sufficient justifications for the censorship and dis-
cipline.77 
 Although the speech in Morse occurred off campus, the plurality 
concluded that there was a sufficient relationship between the school 
and the activity to justify the school’s punishment.78 This connection was 
established because the speech had occurred during school hours, the 
student was at a school-sanctioned event, the banner was in the presence 
of teachers and administrators who were supervising students at the 
event, the school band and cheerleaders were performing, and the mes-
sage was directed at the student body.79 The Court did, however, ac-
knowledge that “[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as 
to when courts should apply school-speech precedents.”80 
                                                                                                                      
75 See id. at 403, 408–10. 
76 Id. at 397. 
77 See id. at 398, 408 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). Justice Alito, in his concurrence, 
clarified that this decision does not give schools the authority to regulate speech that 
comments on political or social issues under the guise that it interferes with the school’s 
“educational mission.” Id. at 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito advocated greater 
speech rights for students than those envisioned by the plurality and argued that school 
authority should be determined only by the school’s need to protect the physical safety of 
students. See id. In Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit interpreted Justice Alito’s concurrence as giving schools the broad author-
ity to censor any speech that threatens the physical safety of students. 508 F.3d 765, 770 
(5th Cir. 2007). In Boim v. Fulton County School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit also interpreted Morse broadly as allowing schools to prohibit speech if 
that speech contains certain subjects, such as illegal drugs, because of the governmental 
interest in stopping certain behaviors, such as drug use and school violence. 494 F.3d 978, 
984 (11th Cir. 2007). 
78 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615, n.22 (5th Cir. 
2004)). In his concurrence to the plurality opinion, Justice Thomas opined that courts 
should defer to the school in all student speech cases because the school acts in loco par-
entis and the Constitution does not provide students with any First Amendment rights in a 
public school. Id. at 418–21 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas argued that if par-
ents do not like the school’s rules, they can send their child to a different school or chal-
lenge the rules through the political process. Id. at 419–20. 
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II. Off-Campus Student Speech Cases 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of school 
discipline of student speech that occurs online.81 Lower courts differ in 
how they apply the Court’s student speech precedents in their analysis 
of online speech that originates off campus but comes onto campus or 
to the attention of school administrators.82 As a result, existing case law 
does not provide students or school administrators with clear guidance 
on when the Constitution permits school regulation of online speech.83 
A. Non-Internet, Off-Campus Student Speech Cases 
1. Applying General First Amendment Principles to Off-Campus 
Speech 
 When student speech originates on campus and is in a tangible or 
audible format, such as a newspaper or assembly address, it is unques-
tioned that courts should analyze the speech using the student speech 
jurisprudence introduced in Part I.84 When the speech originates off-
campus in a tangible format, courts generally analyze the speech using 
the more stringent general First Amendment principles (even if the 
speech is subsequently brought onto campus by a third party).85 For 
example, in 1979, in Thomas v. Board of Education, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit refused to use the school-speech jurispru-
dence to analyze a school’s suspension of a student who distributed a 
newspaper off-campus because only a minimal level of school resources 
were used in the paper’s preparation and distribution.86 Unlike in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the students wrote the paper al-
                                                                                                                      
81 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (The Court avoided clarifying the 
extent of a school’s authority over off-campus speech). The Morse v. Frederick decision pro-
vides the closest indication of how the Court might analyze such a case because Morse dealt 
with speech that was off campus. Id. The Court has denied certiorari on this issue in at 
least one case. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008) (denying certiorari). 
82 See infra notes 108–162 and accompanying text. 
83 See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2004). 
84 See supra notes 42−80 and accompanying text. 
85 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 615; Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (holding that a school could not 
punish a student who extended his middle finger to a teacher off school grounds because 
“[t]he First Amendment protection of freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of 
the effort to force-feed good manners to the ruffians among us”). 
86 607 F.2d at 1050 (“The case before us, however, arises in a factual context distinct 
from that envisioned in Tinker and its progeny. While prior cases involved expression 
within the school itself, all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity in this case was 
deliberately designed to take place beyond the schoolhouse gate.”). 
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most exclusively from home and after school hours, and distributed it 
off-campus.87 Despite these precautions, however, administrators found 
a copy on campus, and suspended the publishers for five days because 
of the paper’s objectionable content.88 
 The Second Circuit applied general First Amendment principles 
and held that the student’s speech did not fall into a category of unpro-
tected speech, such as obscenity, and thus, the school’s discipline was 
unconstitutional.89 Regarding a school’s authority off-campus, the Tho-
mas court stated: “[T]he arm of authority does not reach beyond the 
schoolhouse gate. When an educator seeks to extend his dominion be-
yond these bounds, therefore, he must answer to the same constitu-
tional commands that bind all other institutions of government.”90 
 In his concurrence in Thomas, Judge Newman argued that geogra-
phy should not be a limit on a school’s ability to regulate student 
speech or activity that concerns the school.91 Instead, he opined that a 
court should apply a proximate cause test and permit schools to hold 
students responsible for the “natural and reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of [their] action[s].”92 In Judge Newman’s opinion, the test 
laid out in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District al-
lows for regulation of speech that will foreseeably cause a material and 
substantial disruption, regardless of where the speech originated.93 
Judge Newman suggested that, even if the Tinker standard is not met, 
discipline of students for distributing indecent material off school 
grounds may be justified if the circulation on school property was in-
tended.94 
 In another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also 
refused to apply the school-speech jurisprudence to tangible speech 
that originated off campus.95 In 2004, in Porter v. Ascension Parish School 
Board, the Fifth Circuit refused to use the Tinker test to analyze the in-
definite suspension of a student whose drawing of the school being 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Thomas, 607 F.2d at 
1045. The school contact amounted to a few articles typed on campus and use of a teacher’s 
closet for storage of unsold issues. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045. The students put a note in the 
newspaper disclaiming responsibility for copies found on school campus. Id. 
88 Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1046. The school reasoned that the newspaper was offensive and 
obscene because it included articles on masturbation and prostitution. Id. 
89 See id. at 1050. 
90 Id. at 1045. 
91 See id. at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring). 
95 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 615. 
1578 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1563 
bombed was inadvertently brought to campus by his brother two years 
after he drew it.96 The court reasoned that, because the speech at issue 
occurred off-campus and there was no evidence that the speech was 
directed toward the school campus, the less stringent student speech 
jurisprudence would not be appropriate.97 Thus, the court analyzed the 
drawing using general First Amendment standards, and concluded 
that, because the speech did not constitute a “true threat,” it was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.98 The court also placed weight on the 
intent of the speaker in analyzing whether to use the Tinker test, like 
Judge Newman did in his concurrence in Thomas.99 
 In both Thomas and Porter, the courts assumed that, if the off-
campus speech had fallen into a category of unprotected speech, such 
as true threats or incitement, then the school could regulate it, even 
though the speech occurred off campus.100 This extension of school 
authority seems to contradict the court’s assertion in Thomas that a 
school does not have any authority over off-campus speech.101 Similarly, 
in 2002, in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, which involved a 
threatening letter written off campus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit also assumed that the school had the authority to regu-
late speech that was unprotected under general First Amendment stan-
dards, even though the speech at issue originated off-campus.102 In his 
dissent, Judge McMillian pointed out this contradiction, and ques-
tioned whether the school should have jurisdiction over any speech is-
                                                                                                                      
96 Id. at 611–12. 
97 See id. at 615, 620. 
98 See id. at 618. 
99 Compare id. at 619−20, with Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring). 
100 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 617−18; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 (majority opinion). In a foot-
note in Thomas, the Second Circuit envisioned a situation where “a group of students incites 
substantial disruption within the school from some remote locale.” 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17. 
101 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050. 
102 See 306 F.3d 616, 626−27 (8th Cir. 2002). In Pulaski, the student was expelled for 
writing threatening letters to his ex-girlfriend even though he wrote the letters off campus 
and did not bring them to school himself. Id. at 636 (McMillian, J., dissenting). The stu-
dent’s friend had brought them to school and showed them to the ex-girlfriend, who com-
plained to the principal. Id. at 620 (majority opinion). The court upheld the student’s 
expulsion, stating that the letters were “true threats” and thus not protected under the 
First Amendment. Id. at 626−27 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). 
The court defined a true threat as speech that a reasonable person would interpret as “a 
serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.” Id. at 622. The threat 
must be intentionally and knowingly communicated to the potential victim. Id. at 624. 
Because the speech was unprotected under general First Amendment principles, the Court 
did not need to decide whether the speech would be protected under the school speech 
principles. See id. at 626−27. 
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sued by a student “in the privacy of his home, not at school or during 
school hours or using school equipment . . . .”103 Judge McMillian ar-
gued that the facts of the case involved a purely police matter and that, 
consequently, the school had no authority to act.104 
B. Online Student Speech Cases 
 Courts deciding cases involving speech that originates off campus 
in newspapers or other traditional media have generally applied the 
Thomas analysis outlined above.105 In contrast, courts have used a variety 
of different analyses to determine the extent of school authority over 
students’ online speech.106 The major methods are outlined below.107 
1. The Thomas Analysis 
 At least one court has followed Thomas and Porter and refused to 
apply the less stringent student speech standards to online student 
speech.108 In 2000, in Beidler v. North Thurston School District, the Supe-
rior Court of Washington held unconstitutional the suspension of a 
student who created an Internet parody of the school’s assistant princi-
pal.109 Because the student created the website at his home, no school 
property was involved, and there was no substantial disruption at 
school, the court concluded that none of the less stringent school 
speech standards applied to the speech at issue.110 The court left open 
whether it would have applied the Tinker analysis had there been a ma-
terial and substantial disruption of the work or discipline of the 
                                                                                                                      
103 See id. at 636 (McMillian, J., dissenting). 
104 See id. 
105 See supra notes 84–104 and accompanying text. 
106 See infra notes 108–162 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra notes 108–162 and accompanying text. 
108 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 615; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050; Beidler v. N. Thurston Sch. 
Dist., No. 99-2-00236-6, slip op. at 4−6 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 18, 2000). 
109 Beidler, No. 99-2-00236-6, at 4−6; Am. Civil Liberties Union of Wash. State, Student Gets 
Damages in Web Parody Case (Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.aclu-wa.org/detail.cfm?id=169. 
110 See Beidler, No. 99-2-00236-6, at 6. As in Thomas, the student’s on-campus activities in 
connection with the website were minimal. Compare Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050, with Beidler, No. 
99-2-00236-6, at 5. The court in Beidler admitted that the Internet presents problems of de-
termining the limits of school authority over student activity and drastically changes the 
“landscape upon which the line where the balance tips from protected speech for students to 
permissible punitive power for school administrators.” Beidler, No. 99-2-00236-6, at 3. Never-
theless, the court concluded that, “while the landscape has changed, the line has not.” Id. 
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school.111 Instead, the court applied general First Amendment princi-
ples and concluded that, because the student’s speech did not invoke 
the fighting words doctrine, the student’s speech was off-limits to 
school authorities.112 
2. The Tinker Standard 
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, the majority of courts have 
applied the Tinker analysis without considering where the online speech 
in controversy originated or how it reached campus.113 In 1998, in 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri used the Tinker standard to analyze the ten-
day suspension of a student who used vulgar language on his website to 
criticize the school, despite the fact that, as in Thomas, the student cre-
ated the speech at home and did not personally bring it to campus.114 
As in Thomas and Porter, another student brought the speech to campus 
and showed it to a teacher.115 The court held in favor of the student 
because the website did not create a substantial and material disruption 
to the school environment.116 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Beidler, No. 99-2-00236-6, at 4 (“[T]he evidence does not show material and sub-
stantial disruption of the work or discipline of the school. Regardless of where the geo-
graphical limits of school district authority may lie, Tinker does not support defendants.”). 
112 See id. at 7, 8. 
113 See, e.g., Bowler v. Town of Hudson, No. 05-11007-PBS, slip op. at 19 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 
2007) (applying Tinker and holding that including the link to a website hosting graphic video 
footage of hostage beheadings on a poster displayed at school was a permissible exercise of 
the students’ First Amendment rights because the posters did not cause a substantial disrup-
tion at the school); Dwyer v. Oceanport Sch. Dist., No. 03-6005, slip op. at 1, 15 (D. N.J. Mar. 
31, 2005) (applying Tinker even though the website, which criticized the school and specific 
teachers, was created at home and never shown at school by its creator); Neal v. Efurd, No. 
04-2195, slip op. at 11, 13, 18−19 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 2005) (applying the Tinker analysis even 
though the website, which criticized groups of students and specific teachers, was created at 
home and never shown at school by its creator); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 
781–82, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that the school’s suspension of a student who posted 
on his website a list of people that he wished would die violated the student’s First Amend-
ment rights because there was no proof of disruption to the school, or that the student had 
created the website at school, or intended for it to be accessed at school); Killion v. Franklin 
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448, 450, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (using Tinker to analyze 
the suspension of a student who wrote a derogatory “Top Ten” list about a teacher at the 
school and emailed it to other students, one of whom brought a print-out to school); 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Complaint 
at 4−5, Bowler v. Stapelfeld, No. MBB (D. Mass. May 16, 2005), available at http://www.cit 
medialaw.org/threats/hudson-high-school-v-bowler. 
114 See Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–78, 1182. 
115 Compare id. at 1178, with Porter, 393 F.3d at 615, and Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050. 
116 See Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
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 This unquestioning and automatic application of the school-speech 
jurisprudence to online speech is problematic because it assumes that 
schools can regulate any speech, regardless of where it originated and 
who is responsible for bringing it to school, as long as the speech meets 
the Tinker standard.117 This approach flouts the holdings in Tinker, 
Kuhlmeier, Thomas, and Porter, which established that the school speech 
jurisprudence does not apply unless the speech occurred on campus or 
while the student was under the control and supervision of the 
school.118 
3. The Foreseeability Test 
 In a slightly stricter analysis, some courts have applied the student 
speech jurisprudence—primarily the Tinker analysis—to students’ 
online speech only when it was foreseeable that the speech would make 
its way onto campus.119 This is the approach proposed by Judge New-
man in his concurrence in Thomas.120 For example, in 2007, in 
Wisniewski v. Board of Education, the Second Circuit upheld the expul-
sion of a student who created a drawing online that depicted a specific 
teacher being shot and killed.121 The student never brought the image 
onto campus, but another student showed it to a teacher.122 The court 
applied the Tinker material and substantial disruption test because, the 
court decided, the student had created the image knowing that there 
was a “reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the at-
tention of school authorities and that it would ‘materially and substan-
tially disrupt the work and discipline at the school.’”123 
                                                                                                                      
117 See supra note 113. Contra Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; Be-
thel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
118 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; 
Porter, 393 F.3d at 615; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050. 
119 See infra notes 121–128 and accompanying text. 
120 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring). 
121 494 F.3d 34, 35−36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
122 Id. at 36. 
123 See id. at 38–39 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). The court stated: “The fact that 
[the student’s] creation and transmission of the [Instant Messenger] icon occurred away 
from school property does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline. We have 
recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption 
within a school . . . .” Id. at 39. Unlike in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, the court 
in Wisniewski asserted that the speech does not have to rise to the level of a “true threat” 
under Watts v. United States for the school to have the authority to sanction it. See Wisniewski, 
494 F.3d at 38; Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 621–27. 
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 In an even more surprising case, the Second Circuit extended 
school authority to off-campus online speech that had not yet caused 
any disruption.124 In May 2008, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit 
upheld a school’s punishment of a student for her website’s criticism of 
the school.125 The court applied the Tinker standard because the con-
tent was related to school issues and, the court surmised, the student 
had intended for the blog to be read by students.126 Thus, the court 
concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that other students and 
administrators at her school would become aware of the blog.127 Like in 
Wisniewski, the court adopted Judge Newman’s interpretation of Tinker, 
reasoning that a school may punish off-campus speech if it is foresee-
able that the speech will reach campus and create a substantial disrup-
tion on campus.128 The Second Circuit did, however, question whether 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser was applicable to off-campus 
speech.129 
 The cases interpreting Tinker in this way distort that holding by 
ignoring that Tinker’s test does not apply to off-campus speech.130 It is 
stretching school authority too far to say that schools may punish a stu-
dent for speech that might come onto campus and cause a disruption, 
but has not yet done so.131 Such holdings also present the difficult task 
of determining the foreseeability of the speech reaching campus.132 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 595 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. 
Conn. 2009). 
125 See id. at 45, 53; see supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
126 See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50–52. 
127 See id. In the preceding judgment in Doninger, the district court deferred completely 
to the decision of the school without discussing whether the Tinker or Fraser tests were satis-
fied. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 215 (D. Conn. 2007). This is the posi-
tion advocated by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in Morse. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 418–21 
(Thomas, J., concurring). The Connecticut court stated that it “ha[d] no wish to insert 
itself into the intricacies of the school administrators’ decision-making process.” Doninger, 
514 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 
128 See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48–49 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 
1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring) (“[T]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in 
determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.”)). 
129 Id. at 49. 
130 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13; supra note 47. 
131 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13. 
132 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13. 
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4. The “Sufficient Nexus” Approach 
 A federal district court in Pennsylvania looked to that state’s su-
preme court for guidance in analyzing a student’s online speech.133 In 
2002, in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania attempted to clear up the uncertain boundary of school juris-
diction over online speech by requiring that there be a “sufficient 
nexus” between the online speech and the school before the court 
would analyze the student’s speech under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
school-speech jurisprudence.134 If no such nexus existed, then the court 
would apply the more stringent general First Amendment principles.135 
 In J.S., the court upheld the expulsion of a student whose website 
displayed threatening and derogatory comments about a teacher and 
the principal because the website caused a substantial disruption to the 
school environment.136 Because the student accessed the website at 
school, showed it to other students, and clearly intended for the website 
to be seen by students and teachers at the school, the court concluded 
that there was a “sufficient nexus” between his website and the school 
campus to justify an evaluation under Tinker and Fraser.137 
 The “sufficient nexus” test is more protective of student speech 
than simply applying the Tinker analysis to all student speech cases be-
cause it creates a threshold inquiry before the less stringent school 
speech principles can be applied, and thus attempts to draw a line be-
tween off-campus and on-campus online speech.138 Unlike the three 
approaches to online student speech discussed above, under the “suffi-
cient nexus” test, the manner in which the speech reached campus is 
an important factor.139 
 This analysis was adopted by the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania in 2007, in Layshock v. Hermitage School Dis-
                                                                                                                      
133 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 (W.D. Pa. 2007), 
appeal docketed, No. 07-4465 (3rd Cir. Dec. 10, 2008). 
134 See 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002). 
135 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 602. 
136 J.S., 807 A.2d at 851, 869. The website listed reasons why the targeted teacher must 
die and solicited money from students to pay for a hitman. Id. at 851. The teacher was so 
disturbed by the website that she was unable to return to school to finish the school year. 
Id. at 869. 
137 See id. at 865; see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512−13. The court in 
J.S. was clear that, outside of the school setting, the website was protected speech because 
it did not rise to the level of a true threat. 807 A.2d at 859–60. 
138 See supra note 113. Contra J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
139 See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50–52; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39; Beussink, 30 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1177–78, 1180. 
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trict.140 In this case, a student was suspended for creating a parody of 
the school principal on a social networking website, which he then ac-
cessed at school and showed to other students and a teacher.141 In con-
trast to J.S., the court held that merely accessing a website at school did 
not create a nexus between the website and the school sufficient to jus-
tify applying the school speech jurisprudence to the student’s off-
campus activity.142 Thus, the court analyzed the website using general 
First Amendment principles, and concluded that the student’s suspen-
sion was unconstitutional because the student’s website did not fall un-
der any of the categories of unprotected speech.143 
 The district court’s language in Layshock reveals the confusion cre-
ated by online student speech cases.144 On one hand, the court empha-
sized that “school officials are authorized only to punish speech on 
school property, [and] the student is free to speak his mind when the 
school day ends.”145 On the other hand, the court stated that “the test 
for school authority is not geographical. The reach of school administra-
tors is not strictly limited to the school’s physical property.”146 The court 
in Layshock looked to the Pennsylvania School Code to resolve this prob-
lem and found that the Code defines school authority in a “temporal” 
way, by limiting school authority to times when students are “under the 
supervision of the board of school directors and teachers.”147 
                                                                                                                      
140 496 F. Supp. 2d at 602. 
Regardless of whether the source of the school’s authority is based on timing, 
function, context or interference with its operations, it is incumbent upon the 
school to establish that it had the authority to punish the student. In most cases, 
this will be a simple and straight forward exercise. However, in cases involving 
off-campus speech, such as this one, the school must demonstrate an appropriate 
nexus. As the case law demonstrates, on this threshold “jurisdictional” question 
the Court will not defer to the conclusions of school administrators. 
Id. at 599. 
141 Id. at 591; see also ACLU of Pennsylvania: Layshock v. Hermitage School District, http:// 
www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/studentsuspendedforinterne.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 
2009). The profile caused the principal considerable emotional distress and embarrass-
ment. See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 592. The school attempted to block access to the site 
from school computers but was unable to. Id. No school resources were used in the crea-
tion of the website. Id. at 591. 
142 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601. 
143 See id. 
144 See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
145 Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052). 
146 Id. at 598. 
147 See id. at 598–99 (citing Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1317 (2006); Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5-510 
(1992)). 
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 Despite having such a clear and easily administered standard in 
the statute, the court still decided to use the less definite “sufficient 
nexus” test, presumably to allow for flexibility in applying the student 
speech jurisprudence, depending on the facts of the case.148 The in-
consistency between how the courts in J.S. and Layshock applied the 
“sufficient nexus” test to the issue of accessing the speech at school 
demonstrates how unpredictable and subjective this test is, even though 
it marks an advance over the cases discussed earlier that had no thresh-
old test at all.149 The problem with such an indefinite, multi-factor test 
is that it does not provide sufficient notice to students and administra-
tors of the exact boundary of school authority.150 
C. The Effect of School Rules on School Jurisdiction 
 In some cases, courts have deferred to school decisions by uphold-
ing the enforcement of school rules, even where the student’s speech 
would not be punishable under the tests laid out in the four Supreme 
Court student speech cases.151 For example, in 1973, in Sullivan v. Hous-
ton Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit upheld a school’s expul-
sion of a student who sold his underground newspaper off-campus but 
near the entrance to the school.152 The school expelled the student be-
cause the paper contained “coarse language,” and because the distribu-
tion violated a school rule requiring him to submit the paper to the 
principal for review prior to distributing it.153 Despite the fact that the 
newspaper was distributed off school grounds and did not materially 
and substantially disrupt school activities, the court upheld the expul-
sion because the student “flout[ed] school regulations and def[ied] 
school authorities.”154 Thus, in this case, the school was able to use a 
                                                                                                                      
148 See id. at 601. 
149 See supra notes 113–132 and accompanying text. Compare Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d 
at 601, with J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
150 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how vague speech laws result in the lack of fair notice and the chilling of speech). 
151 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2007); see 
also Beidler, No. 99-2-00236-6, at 6 n.5 (suggesting that, although the school cannot punish 
the student for the content of the speech, if there was punishable action involved in the 
creation of the website, then school discipline might be warranted). 
152 475 F.2d at 1072, 1074. 
153 See id. at 1074. 
154 See id. at 1076. 
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disciplinary rule to restrain speech that would otherwise be subject to 
general First Amendment standards.155 
 Likewise, in 2007, in Requa v. Kent School District, the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington used a school rule to jus-
tify upholding school authority over otherwise protected off-campus 
online speech.156 The court upheld the forty-day suspension of a stu-
dent who had secretly videotaped his teacher in class, in violation of a 
school rule prohibiting the use of personal electronic devices in class, 
and then posted the video online with mocking commentary.157 Al-
though the court in Requa agreed that the off-campus posting of the 
video was protected speech, it upheld the suspension as appropriate 
discipline for the student’s impermissible on-campus conduct.158 The 
court concluded that the school’s “primary responsibility to provide 
safe and supportive learning and working conditions for students and 
faculty” outweighed the student’s interest in having the freedom to 
criticize his teachers.159 
 The reasoning used in Houston Independent School District and Requa 
is arguably unconstitutional because, in Tinker, the plaintiff students 
had violated a school dress code rule, and yet the Court still held that 
the First Amendment prevented the school from prohibiting the stu-
dents’ speech.160 Requa and Houston Independent School District highlight 
the danger that, if a rule is broken, the school will confuse the severity 
of a rule violation with the content of the speech when determining the 
amount of punishment.161 These two cases further illustrate the need to 
draw a clear line that limits school jurisdiction over students’ online 
expression.162 
                                                                                                                      
155 Compare id., with Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050. 
156 See 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1280, 1283. 
157 Id. at 1274−76. 
158 See id. at 1279, 1283. The court concluded that schools must be able to punish any 
on-campus conduct that is disrespectful of a teacher. See id. at 1280−81. 
159 See id. at 1283. 
160 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504, 507−08. 
161 See Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d at 1074; Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1278−79. Coy 
v. Board of Education, decided in 2002, provides an example of a disproportionate punish-
ment given on the basis of the content of the student’s speech and not on the severity of 
the rule violation. See 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794−95, 806 (N.D. Ohio, 2002). In Coy, the 
school suspended a student for eighty days because the student merely violated a school 
policy by accessing his personal website, which he had created at home, from a school 
computer. See id. The court refused to grant the defendants summary judgment because it 
was unclear whether the school had disciplined the student for merely violating a school 
rule or whether they punished him for the content of his speech. Id. 
162 See supra note 161. 
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III. Limiting School Responsibility in School Liability Cases 
A. The Relationship Between School Liability and School Authority 
 In developing a threshold test for school jurisdiction over students’ 
online speech, it is better to rely on established principles of law than to 
invent entirely new standards.163 Established principles provide case law 
and reasoning that courts can draw from.164 School liability cases lend a 
useful perspective to the online student speech cases because they do 
not rely on geography to determine the limits of the “schoolhouse 
gate.”165 Instead, in the liability cases analyzed in this Note, courts used 
a temporal test to determine the school’s duty of care and looked at 
whether the school had assumed supervisory responsibility and control 
over the student at the time the harm occurred.166 
 It is also instructive to look at school liability cases because both a 
school’s authority to control and discipline its students and a school’s 
responsibility to prevent harm to students originally stemmed from the 
doctrine of in loco parentis.167 Under this doctrine, parents cede their 
                                                                                                                      
163 See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–52 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 595 F. 
Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 2009), appeal certified 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49908 (D. Conn. May 
14, 2009); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007); supra note 109. 
164 See supra note 163. 
165 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Jerkins v. 
Anderson, 922 A.2d 1279, 1287 (N.J. 2007). 
166 See infra notes 179, 198 and accompanying text. 
167 See Edward C. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary Practices 11 (1976); 
infra notes 179, 191−193 and accompanying text. The Latin phrase in loco parentis translates to 
“in place of the parent.” Bolmeier, supra, at 9. In loco parentis is a common law doctrine that 
originally gave the school discretionary authority to control and discipline students as parents 
would, and the responsibility to protect students in the parents’ absence. See id. The use of 
the phrase most likely originated from Blackstone’s Commentaries, in which he wrote: 
A parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to 
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has 
such a portion of the power of the parent, viz. that the restraint and correc-
tion, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed. 
Id. (citing Blackstone, Commentaries of the Law of England 453 (T. Cooley ed. 1884)). 
By 1837, states were applying the in loco parentis principle in public school cases to give 
teachers wide discretion in disciplining students. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413–15 
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). The judiciary generally deferred to teachers’ decisions 
on how best to maintain order in the school. Id. at 414. The justification for giving schools 
such discretion was that, like parents, schools could not perform their duty to teach chil-
dren how to be “useful and virtuous members of society . . . without the ability to com-
mand obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad hab-
its.” Id. at 413–14 (quoting State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365–66 (1837)). 
Some state laws rely on the in loco parentis doctrine to describe the scope of a school’s 
duties and authority. See, e.g., 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-24 (West 1995); 24 Pa. Cons. 
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authority over their children to the school when they drop their chil-
dren off.168 Parents then rely on schools to ensure the safety and pro-
ductivity of their children while they are under the school’s care and 
supervision.169 Because both the school’s responsibility to care for stu-
dents and the school’s authority to discipline students arise from the 
same source, examining the limits imposed on a school’s responsibility 
in school liability cases can serve as a guide for how to delineate a 
school’s authority over the online speech of its students.170 
B. The Substantial Control Test in Title IX Cases Involving  
Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment 
 Cases involving actions under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 for student-on-student sexual harassment illustrate how 
courts apply a temporal test to determine the limits of a school’s re-
sponsibility for its students’ well-being.171 Under Title IX, educational 
institutions are prohibited from excluding students from participation 
in educational opportunities on the basis of sex.172 In Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education, in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
                                                                                                                      
Stat. § 13-1317 (2006). For example, Pennsylvania law equates a school’s in loco parentis 
authority with its responsibility to supervise students. § 13-1317. Pennsylvania law codifies 
the in loco parentis principle by giving school officials the “right to exercise the same au-
thority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending his school, during the time 
they are in attendance, including the time required in going to and from their homes, as 
the parents . . . to such pupils may exercise over them.” Id. The Illinois School Code also 
places the school in loco parentis by stating that: 
In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the 
school children, [the school] stand[s] in the relation of parents and guardi-
ans to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected 
with the school program . . . and may be exercised at any time for the safety 
and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents and guardians. 
105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2424. 
The wide authority traditionally afforded to schools under the in loco parentis doctrine 
has diminished with the Supreme Court’s recognition of parental rights to make some 
curricular decisions and students’ rights to privacy and free speech. New Jersey v. T.L.O, 
469 U.S. 325, 336−37 (1985); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512−13; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 534−35 (1925). 
168 See Jerkins, 922 A.2d at 1285. 
169 See id. 
170 See supra note 167; see also Tabor, supra note 72, at 574–78 (discussing other ways the 
teacher-student relationship has been conceptualized). 
171 See infra notes 173–182 and accompanying text. 
172 See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006). The 
relevant section provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. § 1681(a). 
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school may be liable under Title IX for the creation of a hostile educa-
tional environment if the school fails to prevent student-on-student 
sexual harassment because the hostile environment effectively prevents 
the victimized student from benefiting from school attendance.173 In 
Davis, the parents of a fifth grade student sued the school for failing to 
remedy the repeated sexual harassment by another student that their 
child had experienced in the school classrooms and hallways over a 
three-month period.174 The student had told teachers about the har-
assment, but the perpetrator was never disciplined.175 The Court re-
manded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the 
facts of the case entitled the plaintiff to relief under the Court’s new 
interpretation of Title IX.176 
 To recover damages under this theory of liability, a student must 
show that the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, that the 
school acted with “deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment 
in its programs or activities,” and that the harassment was “so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the vic-
tim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”177 Under Title 
IX, a school does not incur a duty to prevent harassment unless the 
“known acts of harassment” occur while students are “subject to the 
guidance and instruction of” or “subject to the authority, direction, or 
                                                                                                                      
173 526 U.S. 629, 637–38 (1999). A school can also incur liability under section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 for deliberately failing to prevent student-on-student harassment motivated by a stu-
dent’s disability. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000); S.S. v. E. Ky. 
Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008). Likewise, a school can incur liability under title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for deliberately failing to prevent student-on-student dis-
crimination or harassment on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Title VI of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (2000); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 
F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998). Liability for student-on-student harassment under these 
statutes is based on the same theory as liability for student-on-student sexual harassment 
under Title IX: by deliberately doing nothing in the face of known harassment, the school 
is intentionally facilitating that harassment. See S.S., 532 F.3d at 454; Bryant v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus, in each of these actions, a court 
will analyze the school’s actions based on the same “deliberate indifference” test estab-
lished in Davis. See S.S., 532 F.3d at 454; Bryant, 334 F.3d at 934. 
174 Davis, 526 U.S. at 633−35. 
175 Id. at 634−35. 
176 Id. at 654. 
177 Id. at 633, 642. “Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-
calling among school children . . . even where these comments target differences in gen-
der.” Id. at 652. The severity of the harassment depends on the type, frequency, and dura-
tion of the conduct. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Em-
ployees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12041 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
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supervision of” a school that receives federal funding.178 In Davis, the 
Court interpreted this statutory language as meaning that a school’s 
liability is limited to incidents occurring when the school “exercises 
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the 
known harassment occurs.”179 Because this is a temporal test, and not a 
geographic one, a school can be liable under Title IX for student-on-
student harassment that takes place off campus, as long as it occurs at a 
time and place where the school has assumed substantial supervisory 
control over the student.180 
 Thus, under the requirements laid out in Davis, a school could 
only be held liable for being deliberately indifferent to known acts of 
harassment that occur on the Internet if the school had assumed “sub-
stantial control” over the perpetrator student at the moment when he 
or she harassed the victim student.181 This might be the case if the stu-
dent used school computers to access or send messages on the Inter-
net, but not if the student issued the harassing speech at home.182 
C. The Control and Supervision Test in Negligent Supervision Cases 
 The long-established and widely-recognized liability in tort for neg-
ligent supervision as applied to schools also turns on whether a school 
has assumed supervisory responsibility and control over the student at 
                                                                                                                      
178 Davis, 526 U.S. at 645 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Diction-
ary 2487 (1961)) (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2006), which defines the phrase “pro-
gram or activity” from 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006)). 
179 Id. The Court reasoned that liability was justified because “the nature of [the 
State’s] power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree 
of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.” Id. at 646 (quot-
ing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). Furthermore, the Court 
asserted that schools have the “comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools.” Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507). 
The four dissenting Justices argued that student-on-student harassment is never “un-
der” the schools’ “program or activity.” Id. at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also 
pointed out that the school’s control over its students is complicated and limited, and is of 
a different nature than the control a school exercises over its teachers. Id. at 664. The dis-
sent outlined the legal and practical obstacles a school faces in trying to control the con-
duct of its students, such as laws protecting the educational rights of students with disabili-
ties, state constitutional rights to education, and the limited resources of schools. Id. at 
664, 666. 
180 See Morgan v. Bend-La Pine Sch. Dist., No. CV-07-173-ST, 2009 WL 312423, at *23 
(D. Or. Feb. 6, 2009) (holding that a school could be liable for failing to prevent student-
on-student sexual harassment that occurred on a number of school field trips and on the 
school buses because, although the students were off campus, they were under the super-
vision of teachers on the field trips and the bus driver reported directly to the school). 
181 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Morgan, 2009 WL 312423, at *23. 
182 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Morgan, 2009 WL 312423, at *23. 
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the time of the alleged negligence.183 Negligent supervision is the most 
common action brought against schools by families.184 In at least forty 
states, a school may be liable for negligent supervision if the school un-
reasonably fails to prevent the foreseeable injury of a student.185 
 Foreseeability of the injury is determined by looking at a totality of 
the circumstances.186 For example, if a school is aware that a student is 
being bullied continuously by another student either on or off campus, 
and that bullying escalates to violence at a time when the school has as-
sumed supervisory duties, then a court may find that the school had a 
duty to prevent the foreseeable escalation.187 As in a Title IX action for 
                                                                                                                      
183 See Coates v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 347 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Wash. 1960). 
184 Valente & Valente, supra note 15, at 124. 
185 See generally Allan E. Korpela, Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher 
Learning for Injuries Resulting from Lack or Insufficiency of Supervision, 38 A.L.R. 3d 830 
(1971). To prevail on a claim of negligent supervision a plaintiff must show: 1) that the 
school owed a duty of care to the student because the school had assumed supervisory 
control over the student; 2) breach of the school’s duty of care by either a total lack of 
supervision or ineffective supervision; 3) harm; and 4) the breach proximately caused the 
harm. M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 518–19 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2003). A school is obligated to exercise the degree of care “which a person of 
ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same 
circum[s]tances.” Id. at 518 (alteration in the original) (citing Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. 
Dist., 470 P.2d 360, 363 (Cal. 1970)). Nevertheless, there are limits on the school’s duty to 
supervise and the “school district is not an insurer of its students’ safety.” Id. at 526. 
The common law rule regarding a duty of care is that “one owes no duty to control the 
conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.” Id. at 517. A duty of 
care will arise when: “(a) A special relation exists between the actor and the third person 
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special 
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.” 
Id. The Restatement (Third) of Torts describes the teacher-student relationship as a special 
relationship. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 40 (Ten-
tative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
California courts, for example, have concluded that the compulsory nature of educa-
tion creates a special relationship between the school and its students and, thus, the school 
has an affirmative duty to “take all reasonable steps to protect its students.” M.W., 110 Cal. 
App. 4th at 517; Justin Wieland, Peer-on-Peer Hate Crime and Hate-Motivated Incidents Involving 
Children in California’s Public Schools: Contemporary Issues in Prevalence, Response and Preven-
tion, 11 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 235, 239 (2007). Despite the language in the Restate-
ment, many states do not recognize an action against schools for failure to act based on a 
special relationship. See, e.g., Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1166−67 (Colo. D.C. 
2001). 
186 See M.W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 519. For an incident to be foreseeable, it is not re-
quired that an identical event or injury has previously occurred or that the specific harm 
that occurred was foreseeable. See id. One only needs to show only that harm of that gen-
eral kind was reasonably foreseeable. See id. 
187 Id. at 520−21; Beacham v. City of Starkville Sch. Sys., 984 So.2d 1073, 1079 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2008) (Carlton, J., concurring) (“Where . . . the school district has knowledge of a 
prior incident, and it has received continued complaints of harassment, the risk of a sub-
sequent incident is foreseeable.”). For example, in 2003, in M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista 
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peer-on-peer sexual harassment, the school must have had actual knowl-
edge of the perpetrator’s “assaultive propensities” in order to be held 
liable for student-on-student harassment or injury.188 Schools may also 
have a duty to warn parents if they have actual knowledge of potential 
harm to a student that might occur outside of the school’s supervision 
and control.189 
 Courts consider a variety of policy and fairness factors before im-
posing a duty of reasonable supervision on a school, however, a duty 
does not arise unless the school has assumed control and supervision 
over the student at the time the alleged negligence occurs.190 The duty 
of reasonable supervision arises because, under the in loco parentis doc-
trine, when a school assumes supervisory control over a child, the 
school obtains authority over and bears responsibility for the child in 
lieu of the child’s parents.191 Thus, the limit of school responsibility for 
supervision is not geographic.192 Rather, the line is at the point where 
responsibility for the supervision of the child is transferred to the par-
ent.193 Because the test for school responsibility is temporal and not 
geographic, teachers have the same supervisory responsibility to exer-
                                                                                                                      
Union School, the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District held that the school 
owed a duty of care to a special education student who was sodomized in a school bath-
room by another student because the assault was foreseeable and it occurred while the 
student was entrusted to the school’s care. M.W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 520−21. The escala-
tion from constant bullying to assault was foreseeable because the perpetrator in that case 
had been disciplined over thirty times for various infractions and the victim, M.W., had 
complained multiple times to teachers about the daily bullying. Id. at 520. 
188 See M.W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 513−16, 523; Garufi v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough 
County, 613 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
189 See Eisel v. Bd. of Educ., 597 A.2d 447, 448–50, 456 (Md. App. 1991) (holding that 
school counselors had a duty to warn a student’s parents that she had expressed suicidal 
thoughts, and that the counselors could therefore be liable for failing to prevent the stu-
dent’s off-campus suicide); Valente & Valente, supra note 15 at 129–30. 
190 See Coates, 347 P.2d at 1096−97. The other factors courts consider include the age 
and maturity of the students, the nature of the harm, the level of risk that the harm would 
occur, the opportunity and ability of the school to exercise care, and the public interest 
served by imposing a duty. See M.W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 519, 527 (Levy, J. dissenting); 
Dailey, 470 P.2d at 364; Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History, 283 N.E.2d 899, 902 
(Ill. App. 1st 1972); Eisel, 597 A. 2d at 452; Jerkins, 922 A.2d at 1285. 
191 See Jerkins, 922 A.2d at 1285 (determining that “‘[p]arents . . . relinquish their su-
pervisory role over their children to teachers and administrators during school hours,’ and 
thus ‘transfer to school officials the power to act as guardians of those young wards’”) 
(omission in original); Bolmeier, supra note 167, at 9. 
192 See Jerkins, 922 A.2d at 1287 (holding that the school had a duty of reasonable su-
pervision during school dismissal and that the school could be liable for a child’s injury 
that occurred off-campus and out of the sight of school officials if the injury was the fore-
seeable result of a school’s negligent dismissal of the child). 
193 See id. at 1285. 
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cise reasonable care on school-sponsored trips and activities off campus 
as they have on campus.194 
 The key question is not whether the school was actually supervis-
ing the student, but rather whether the school had assumed supervisory 
responsibility and control over the student.195 For example, in 1967, in 
Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School District, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that a school had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a 
student’s injury at an off-campus student club event, because the school 
had assumed responsibility for the event by assigning a faculty member 
to supervise it.196 In this case, the faculty supervisor failed to attend the 
event and, due to the lack of proper supervision, a student was in-
jured.197 As in Davis, the court rejected the school’s assertion that 
school liability is limited by geography to the school premises and in-
stead emphasized that both liability and authority arise from the 
schools “exercise or assumption of control and supervision over the 
organization and its activities.”198 
 Conversely, a school is not responsible for student injury when the 
time and place of the student’s activity enters the zone of parental au-
thority and the school has not assumed any supervisory authority.199 For 
example, in 1960, in Coates v. Tacoma School District No. 10, a student was 
injured in a car accident miles away from the school, at 2:00 a.m., after 
an initiation ceremony for a non-school sponsored club.200 The Su-
preme Court of Washington held that the school did not have a duty to 
supervise because there was no allegation that the club initiation was a 
school-sanctioned activity.201 Instead, the court explained, the parents 
were responsible for adequately supervising their child’s voluntary ac-
                                                                                                                      
194 See, e.g., Morris v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. No. 9, 403 P.2d 775, 776–77 (Or. 1965) 
(holding teachers on a school trip liable for the injury to a child who was crushed by a log 
at the beach because the accident was foreseeable and the teachers could have mitigated 
the harm by paying more attention). The duty to reasonably supervise school-sponsored 
activities parallels the school’s authority to regulate the contents of a school-sponsored 
publication. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988). 
195 See Chappel v. Franklin Pierce Sch. Dist. No. 402, 426 P.2d 471, 475 (Wash. 1967). 
196 See id. at 472−73, 475. 
197 See id. at 472–73. 
198 See id. at 472–73, 475 (“[T]he nexus between an assertion of the school district’s au-
thority and potential tort liability springs from the exercise or assumption of control and 
supervision over the organization and its activities by appropriate agents of the school 
district.”). 
199 See Coates, 347 P.2d at 1097. 
200 Id. at 1094. 
201 See id. at 1095−97. 
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tivities that took place well after school hours and far from the 
school.202 
IV. A New Analysis for Online Student Speech Cases 
A. The Proposed Control and Supervision Test 
 The Internet is unique because it exists both at home and at 
school and, thus, a geographical test for school jurisdiction in these 
cases is unworkable.203 Because both school liability and school author-
ity are rooted in the theory that the school acts at least partially in loco 
parentis, the control and supervision test that courts have used consis-
tently and successfully in school liability determinations provides a clear 
and established way of delineating school jurisdiction in school speech 
cases.204 This Note proposes using the control and supervision test to 
determine school jurisdiction over students’ online speech because it is 
a temporal test and, as a result, it avoids the problem of establishing a 
geographical location for online speech.205 
 Under this proposed test, schools would have jurisdiction to regu-
late only speech that occurs when the school has assumed control and 
supervision over the student who is speaking.206 Speech would be con-
sidered within the school’s authority only when the student accesses 
                                                                                                                      
202 See id. at 1097. 
203 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597–98 (W.D. Pa. 2007), 
appeal docketed, No. 07-4465 (3rd Cir. Dec. 10, 2008) (stating “[i]t is clear that the test for 
school authority is not geographical” and “[s]chools have an undoubted right to control 
conduct within the scope of their activities, but they must share the supervision of children 
with other, equally vital, institutions such as families, churches, community organizations 
and the judicial system.”); Beidler v. N. Thurston Sch. Dist., No. 99-2-00236-6, slip op. at 3 
(Wash. Super. Ct. July 18, 2000). 
204 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Chappel v. Franklin Pierce Sch. Dist. No. 402, 
426 P.2d 471, 475 (Wash. 1967). 
205 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475. 
206 See Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475. Under the tests for school jurisdiction described in Part 
II, courts appear to have assumed that a school can punish online speech that is unpro-
tected under general First Amendment standards. See supra notes 81−162 and accompany-
ing text. In contrast, the control and supervision test provides a bright line limit on school 
jurisdiction. Contra supra notes 81−162 and accompanying text. If the speech does not 
occur while the school has assumed supervisory control over the student, then any school 
interference is simply impermissible under any First Amendment standard, whether gen-
eral or student-specific. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 636 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (McMillian, J., dissenting). Even if the speech constitutes a true threat or ob-
scenity, it is still impractical to expect or allow the school to police the Internet, and it is 
not the school’s proper role. See id. 
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and shows the online speech to others, or creates the online speech 
while that student is under the assumed control and supervision of the 
school.207 All other online student speech would remain outside of the 
school’s jurisdiction and under the authority of the parent or law en-
forcement to regulate.208 
 Moreover, a school would not have jurisdiction over speech just 
because it relates to the school, as in Doninger v. Niehoff.209 Nor would 
this test give schools jurisdiction over speech just because a student tells 
another student to visit his website, or because a student apparently in-
tended the speech to come to campus.210 A student’s intent should not 
be the definitive test, because it is difficult to prove a student’s actual 
subjective intent.211 Instead, it is only fair to punish a student if he or 
she was the one who brought the speech onto the school grounds.212 In 
contrast to proposals that courts apply school-speech jurisprudence 
when a student intends for the speech to reach the school campus, the 
proposed test has the advantage of certainty because it does not de-
pend upon the divination of a student’s subjective intent.213 
 Like the “sufficient nexus” test, this test asks a threshold jurisdic-
tional question before applying the school-speech jurisprudence.214 A 
court applying the proposed test will only analyze whether the speech 
caused a “substantial and material disruption,” or falls under one of the 
                                                                                                                      
207 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475. 
208 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475; see also Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”). 
209 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 202, 211 (2007), aff’d 527 F.3d 41, 44 
(2d Cir. 2008), aff’d 595 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 2009), appeal certified 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49908 (D. Conn. May 14, 2009); see supra notes 2−5 and accompanying text. 
210 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591−92. Contra Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 202, 211. 
211 See J.S. v. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (applying school speech juris-
prudence because the student intended for his website to be seen by students and teachers 
at the school). 
212 Compare Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing to 
condone school discipline for a newspaper distributed off campus, even though it was 
foreseeable that the paper would end up on campus), with Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 
F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008), Beussink v. Woodland R-IV 
Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 1998), and J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
213 Compare Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2004), 
with Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50−52; J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. Contra Adamovich, supra note 31, at 
1108; Kenneth R. Pike, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by Repairing Judicial 
Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 971, 1002; 
Christopher E. Roberts, Is MySpace Their Space?: Protecting Student Cyberspeech in a Post-Morse 
v. Frederick World, 76 U. Mo. Kansas City L. Rev. 1177, 1177 (2008). 
214 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
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other tests the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for student speech if 
the online speech is deemed to have occurred at a time when the 
school had assumed control and supervision over the student.215 The 
proposed test is more easily understood by students and administrators 
than the “sufficient nexus” test, however, because it relies on terminol-
ogy and temporal limits that have long been in practice.216 
B. Justifications for a Control and Supervision Based Test 
1. The Proposed Test Is Based on Established Principles of Law 
 The control and supervision test for determining school authority 
is rooted in established legal principles that have been consistently and 
successfully applied to determine school responsibility in situations 
where school jurisdiction was not immediately apparent.217 Courts ana-
lyzing cases brought under federal statutes like Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 and state tort law for negligent supervision 
have used a control and supervision test to define the limits of school 
responsibility.218 
 This test is also consistent with the line-drawing analysis employed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in its student speech jurisprudence.219 In 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District in 1969 and 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier in 1988, the Court expressly limited 
the application of the relaxed student First Amendment standards to 
instances when the speech occured within the school environment and 
the students were under the control of teachers.220 In 2007, in Morse v. 
Frederick, the Court based the school’s jurisdiction over the speech on 
the fact that, although the student displayed the banner in public and 
off campus, the student was under the supervision and control of 
school staff at the moment the speech was issued.221 Similarly, in Kuhl-
                                                                                                                      
215 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400–01 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71, 273 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684, 688 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
216 Compare Davis, 526 U.S. at 645, and Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475, with Layshock, 496 F. 
Supp. 2d at 599. 
217 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Chappel, 426 P.2d at 472, 475; Coates v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. 
No. 10, 347 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wash. 1960); supra notes 119−146 and accompanying text. 
218 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475; see supra notes 173, 192 and 
accompanying text. 
219 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684, 
688 (Brennan, J., concurring); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
220 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
221 See 551 U.S. at 400–01. 
2009] Public School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity 1597 
meier, the fact that the school “exercised a great deal of control over” 
the school newspaper was the key factor in the Court’s determination 
that the paper was not a public forum and the school’s speech censor-
ship was permissible.222 
 A control and supervision test would also align with the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits’ reasoning in the 
off-campus student speech cases involving traditional media.223 For ex-
ample, in 1979, in Thomas v. Board of Education, the Second Circuit 
made clear that school administrators may not regulate what students 
are exposed to after they leave school and, instead, it is a parent’s re-
sponsibility and right to monitor what students say and do when they 
are not under the school’s control.224 
 Furthermore, this test has already been successfully applied in one 
online student speech case.225 In 2000, in Emmett v. Kent School District, 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington applied 
the control and supervision test to determine the limits of school juris-
diction.226 The court held unconstitutional a school’s suspension of a 
student who published a website featuring mock obituaries, because the 
student had created the website while he was at his home and “outside 
of the school’s supervision or control.”227 It was irrelevant that the in-
tended audience included students at the school.228 
2. The Proposed Test Prevents Over-Extension of School Authority and 
the Chilling of Protected Student Speech 
 A clear test for school jurisdiction over students’ online activity is 
necessary because the current, unsettled state of the law will inevitably 
result in the chilling of students’ online activity, a lack of fair notice to 
students, the potentially unlimited expansion of school authority, and 
an excess of litigation.229 The proposed control and supervision test 
remedies these concerns by providing a clear and easily administrable 
                                                                                                                      
222 See 484 U.S. at 268, 270–71 (“These activities may fairly be characterized as part of 
the school curriculum . . . so long as they are supervised by faculty”). 
223 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 611–12; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051. 
224 See id. (“Parents still have their role to play in bringing up their children, and school 
officials, in such instances, are not empowered to assume the character of Parens patriae.”). 
225 See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
226 See id. 
227 Id. at 1089−90. 
228 See id. 
229 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
1598 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1563 
guide for schools and students on exactly when it is permissible for a 
school to regulate students’ online activity.230 
 Furthermore, this test prevents the unbounded extension of a 
school’s power over off-campus speech because it limits school authority 
to the easily identifiable circumstances when the school is responsible 
for supervising students and regulating their behavior.231 Thus, the pro-
posed test prevents schools from infringing on the privacy of students’ 
home activities, and adheres to the long-standing First Amendment 
principle that the government has no business telling an individual what 
he may read or view in the privacy of his or her home.232 This protection 
from state interference in the home also extends to any writings or 
speech.233 
 In contrast, if schools are given the authority to punish and censor 
any student activity on the Internet that will foreseeably reach school 
campus, then the potential jurisdiction of school power over students’ 
online activity would be limitless.234 The foreseeability test potentially 
expands school authority to all online student speech because it is ar-
guably foreseeable that any online speech will reach school grounds.235 
 Furthermore, liability for negligent supervision depends on 
whether the school assumed supervisory responsibility over the child 
and his or her activities at the time the harm occurred.236 As a result, if 
schools assume authority over online speech created at home, then 
parents might expect that schools are policing the Internet and, in 
turn, hold schools responsible for not acting to prevent or punish 
online threats or harassment.237 Thus, the expansion of school jurisdic-
tion over online student speech could lead to a parallel expansion of 
                                                                                                                      
230 See supra notes 204–216 and accompanying text. 
231 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051; Brief for The Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellees, Layshock, No. 07-4465, at 7, available at http://www.aclupa.org/legal/ 
legaldocket/studentsuspendedforinterne.htm [hereinafter Rutherford Institute]. 
232 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–68 (1969). 
233 See Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 624 (“Requiring less than an intent to communicate the 
purported threat would run afoul of the notion that an individual’s most protected right is 
to be free from governmental interference in the sanctity of his home and in the sanctity 
of his own personal thoughts.”); Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051. 
234 See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35. 
235 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concurring). For this reason, the 
Thomas court rejected using the foreseeability test to determine school jurisdiction over 
student speech. See id. at 1052−53 n.18 (majority opinion) (explaining that this power eas-
ily could be stretched to punish a student who engages in activity that should be within the 
realm of parental authority and responsibility, such as buying a vulgar magazine and giving 
it to a school friend while at home, or writing a scandalous letter to the New York Times). 
236 See Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475. 
237 See Pike, supra note 213, at 1006. 
2009] Public School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity 1599 
school liability for negligent failure to prevent foreseeable injury.238 
Such expansion of school jurisdiction over activities that occur outside 
of the school’s control and supervision has been explicitly rejected in 
Title IX and negligent supervision cases and therefore must also be re-
jected in online student speech cases.239 
 An additional concern with undefined school authority is that it may 
chill protected speech.240 In Thomas, the Second Circuit was concerned 
about the chilling of protected expression that might result if schools are 
given the authority to punish speech that occurs off campus.241 It is vital 
to protect against the chilling of online student speech because the 
Internet provides a public forum on which students can experiment with 
their First Amendment right to express themselves freely.242 Further, it 
would be ironic and unfortunate if schools were responsible for the chill-
ing of such experimentation because the school is supposed to be where 
students learn about their constitutional rights.243 
                                                                                                                      
238 See Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475; Pike, supra note 213, at 1006. 
239 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Morgan v. Bend-La Pine Sch. Dist., No. CV-07-173-ST, 
2009 WL 312423, at *23 (D. Or. Feb. 6, 2009); Beacham v. City of Starkville Sch. Sys., 984 
So.2d 1073, 1075 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
240 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051. 
241 See id. (“The risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected 
speech and thereby inhibit future expression.”). The chilling effect of school discipline 
can be considerable because of school officials’ “susceptibility to community pressure,” 
their low level of understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence, the possibility that a 
principal will “act ‘arbitrarily, erratically, or unfairly,’” and the low likelihood that a student 
will challenge a punishment. See id. at 1051–52 (quoting Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 
440 F.2d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
242 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853, 863 (1997) (stating that 
the Internet is “‘the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed’ . . . [and] is 
entitled to the ‘highest protection from governmental intrusion.’” (citation omitted). Pub-
lic forums are places of general public access and, because of their pubic nature, are where 
First Amendment protections are strongest. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). “Nonpublic forums are government properties that the gov-
ernment can close to all speech activities. The government may prohibit or restrict speech 
in nonpublic forums as long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” 
Denning & Taylor, supra note 58, at 840 n.25 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitu-
tional Law: Principles and Policies § 11.4.2.4, at 1139 (3d ed. 2006)). The Internet is a 
public forum and Internet speech contrasts starkly with speech that is insulated within the 
school environment, like the school newspaper in Kuhlmeier. See 484 U.S. at 267–70 (con-
cluding that the school newspaper was a non-public forum and, thus, the school could 
regulate its contents). 
243 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that children learn by example, and it would be inconsistent to “charge teachers with 
the task of imbuing their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional 
democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to re-
spect constitutional protections”). In his concurrence in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, Justice Marshall argued that one cannot benefit fully from the freedom 
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 The vague and unpredictable standards currently applied in online 
student speech cases do not give students any guidance on when their 
expression is beyond the school’s reach.244 Instead, current case law 
sends students the message that the only way to definitely prevent disci-
pline at school is to avoid speaking on the Internet altogether.245 Thus, 
until there is a simple and unambiguous limit on school authority over 
the Internet, students’ online speech may be substantially chilled.246 The 
control and supervision test prevents the chilling of student’s protected 
online expression because it is a test that students can easily compre-
hend.247 Additionally, because the proposed test only holds students ac-
countable when the student brings his or her own speech to campus, 
students need not fear that another student will subject them to pun-
ishment by bringing their online speech to school.248 
 In contrast, the “foreseeability” standard advocated by Judge 
Newman in Thomas, and used by the Second Circuit in Wisniewski v. 
Board of Education and Doninger, gives the school too much authority to 
intervene in off-campus speech and does not provide students fair no-
tice of when they may be punished by the school.249 That test presents 
the difficult task of determining to what extent one can expect adoles-
cents to predict the consequences of their online activity.250 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                      
of speech or participate fully in the political process without an education. 411 U.S. 1, 115 
n.74 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). Similarly, the majority stated that education is “es-
sential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization 
of the right to vote.” Id. at 35. In Tinker, the Court stated that “[t]he vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. 
The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’” 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian 
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted)). It is clear that “free speech 
is of special value in the school setting” and “[s]chools offer a laboratory-like setting that 
encourages diverse thoughts.” J.S., 807 A.2d at 854; see also Papandrea, supra note 25, at 
1078, 1082 (discussing the benefits to young people of expressing themselves on the 
Internet). 
244 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051–52. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. at 1051; Rutherford Institute, supra note 231, at 7 (expressing concern that 
extending school authority over “[a]nything posted by public school students on the 
Internet that even vaguely relates to the school environment, teachers, students, etc. . . .” 
will result in “rife potential for abuse by school administrators . . .”). 
247 See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing how 
vague speech laws result in the lack of fair notice and the chilling of speech). 
248 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 619−20 (refusing to apply the Tinker test because the speech at 
issue occurred off campus and there was no evidence that the speech was directed toward 
the school campus); supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
249 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concur-
ring). 
250 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J., concur-
ring). 
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the foreseeability test chills speech because it does not matter who was 
responsible for bringing the speech to campus.251 Although the “suffi-
cient nexus” test is an improvement over the foreseeability test or no 
threshold test at all, it is still quite vague and, because it considers many 
variables, it does not provide students with the bright line rule that they 
need in order to make informed decisions about their online activity.252 
3. The Proposed Test Avoids a Legal Quandary 
 Because it would make the tests for school liability and school au-
thority equivalent, adopting the proposed control and supervision test 
would ensure that schools would not be placed on legally and constitu-
tionally uncertain ground when deciding whether to restrict or punish 
a student’s online speech.253 As established by the Title IX and negli-
gent supervision cases, schools can only be liable for failing to prevent 
injury or harassment that occurs when the school has assumed supervi-
sory responsibility and control over the student.254 Thus, to satisfy their 
legal obligations, schools only need to be concerned with regulating 
speech or conduct that occurs under their control and supervision, and 
the proposed test allows for this.255 
 An examination of cases alleging school liability for negligent su-
pervision reveals that, under the control and supervision analysis used 
in those cases, it is unlikely that a school would be held liable for negli-
gent supervision for failing to prevent online student-on-student har-
assment that takes place outside of the school’s supervision and con-
trol, and reported case law does not provide instances of such 
liability.256 This is because it would be unreasonable to require a school 
to protect students from what occurs on the Internet at times when 
their use of the Internet is outside of the school’s control.257 The few 
                                                                                                                      
251 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1053 n.18 (Newman, J., concurring). 
252 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601−02; J.S., 807 A.2d at 865; supra notes 133−150 
and accompanying text. 
253 See Baldas, supra note 8; supra notes 33−36 and accompanying text. 
254 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Jerkins v. Anderson, 922 A.2d 1279, 1285 (N.J. 2007); 
Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475; supra notes 171–202 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 171–202 and accompanying text. 
256 See, e.g., Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (holding that the school did not have jurisdic-
tion to punish a student’s online speech because the student was not under the school’s con-
trol and supervision when the speech was issued); M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. 
Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 517–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Beacham, 984 So.2d at 1075 (stating 
that incidents of student-on-student harassment “that occurred off school grounds, such as 
harassing phone calls and rumors throughout the community . . . are of no consequence to 
this matter”); Korpela, supra note 185. 
257 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475. 
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negligence cases alleging failure to prevent student-on-student harass-
ment focused only on the harassment that occurred under the school’s 
supervision, and rejected the possibility that the school would be liable 
for harassment occurring outside of the school’s supervision and con-
trol, even where the school knew about the off-campus incidents.258 
Thus, schools are not responsible for policing student activity on the 
Internet, and it follows that schools should also lack the authority to 
police the Internet.259 
 This is not to say that a school should ignore harassment or bully-
ing that is brought to their attention, but a school should be limited to 
taking measures to prevent incidents from occurring while students are 
under the school’s supervision.260 For example, schools can block web-
sites so that students cannot access them at school, thus diminishing 
the chance that the websites will cause any disruption at school.261 
Schools can also make rules against accessing certain websites while on 
school grounds, which would deter online activity from infiltrating the 
school environment.262 
                                                                                                                      
258 See Beacham, 984 So.2d at 1075. For an argument that the schools should have an af-
firmative duty to prevent student-on-student harassment, see Daniel B. Weddle, Brutality 
and Blindness: Bullying in Schools and Negligent Supervision by School Officials, in Our Promise: 
Achieving Educational Equality for America’s Children 385, 386−87 (Maurice R. 
Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle, eds., 2009). 
259 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 645; Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 636 (McMillian, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the school should be uninvolved in off-campus speech and that any speech 
that violates the criminal law can be dealt with by the police); Chappel, 426 P.2d at 475. In 
Thomas, the Second Circuit emphasized that a school’s desire to protect students and 
teachers does not justify its reaching out to the home and punishing a student for activity 
done there. 607 F.2d at 1051. 
260 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 620. Schools may be able to deter cyberbullying by educating 
parents and students about the psychological effects of cyberbullying, and teaching stu-
dents how to express their emotions in a constructive way. See Neal v. Efurd, No. 04-2195, 
slip op. at 22 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 2005) (urging schools to view controversial speech as an 
opportunity to educate students about their civil rights, and not as a source of disruption); 
In re George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1019 n.10 (Cal. 2004) (“encouraging students to express 
their feelings teaches students to write out their feelings rather than acting them out and 
permits early intervention.”); Papandrea, supra note 25, at 1102 (arguing that, instead of 
punishing students, schools should focus on being more tolerant of unpopular speech and 
on teaching students how to use the Internet responsibly). 
261 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
262 See Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Requa 
v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2007). The punishment 
for violating these rules, however, must be commensurate to the rule violation and should 
not be based on the content of the student’s Internet speech. See supra note 161 and 
accompanying text. 
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4. The Proposed Test Provides for a School’s Unique Needs 
 The primary justifications given by the Supreme Court for afford-
ing students only limited First Amendment rights are that: (1) public 
schools are not traditional public forums and, as a result, a school’s in-
action may be interpreted by the community as the school’s endorse-
ment of a student’s speech,263 and (2) schools have a legal, profes-
sional, and ethical duty to maintain control and protect students in the 
school environment.264 The control and supervision test appropriately 
provides for these considerations, as well as protecting the rights of stu-
dents when they are speaking in a public forum.265 
 The Court recognized in Kuhlmeier that the risk of an observer as-
suming that the school is endorsing a student’s speech is most potent 
when the speech is issued while the student is under the control and 
supervision of the school.266 Thus, the proposed test properly gives 
schools the authority to regulate speech in circumstances where those 
outside the school community might interpret the speech as being 
school-sponsored.267 
 Applying the control and supervision test to student online ex-
pression will not unduly restrict the school’s ability to provide for the 
safety of its students because, if a school administrator believes that a 
student’s online speech and other circumstances indicate that a student 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of students and teachers at the 
school, the administrator can work with parents and, where appropri-
                                                                                                                      
263 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267, 272−73. See generally Susan Garrison, The Public School 
as Public Forum, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 90 (1975) (discussing the school as a potentially public 
forum). 
264 See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (“The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular 
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s 
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behav-
ior.”); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1049; Nat’l Educ. Assoc., Code of 
Ethics of the Education Profession (1975), http://sites.nea.org/aboutnea/code.html 
(making it an education professional’s ethical obligation to “make reasonable effort to 
protect the student from conditions harmful to learning or to health and safety”). For 
example, in J.S., the court analyzed the student’s speech by balancing the student’s interest 
in free speech against the school’s interest in providing a “safe and productive school envi-
ronment.” See 807 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. 2002). 
265 See infra notes 266−273 and accompanying text. 
266 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 268, 270−71. 
267 See id. at 267 (“The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, 
parks, and other traditional public forums that ‘time out of mind, have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions.’”) (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
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ate, law enforcement to address the threatening online speech.268 Fur-
thermore, statutes in many states allow a school to suspend a student 
who is charged with a felony committed on or off campus, and expel a 
student who is convicted of a felony if the school administrator deter-
mines that “the student’s continued presence in school would have a 
substantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the school.”269 
Thus, in these states, if threats or harassment constitute a felony and a 
student is charged, then the school has the authority to suspend the 
student.270 
 Finally, if school staff or students are harmed by online speech, they 
may have recourse using civil torts, such as defamation or slander, or in 
criminal statutes prohibiting true threats or harassment.271 Schools are 
not equipped for the role of law enforcement and they should not be 
the discretionary enforcers of these statutory remedies.272 If there are 
gaps in the law regarding online activity, legislatures need to respond by 
creating civil remedies and criminal sanctions to address true threats, 
defamation, harassment, obscenity, and other forms of potentially dam-
aging online speech that may be directed at students, teachers, or ad-
ministrators.273 
                                                                                                                      
268 See, e.g., Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 632 (“[H]ad [the plaintiff] had a criminal record, or 
handed the letter to [his ex-girlfriend] directly, or previously expressed an intent to hurt 
her, it would be far easier to conclude that [his ex-girlfriend] reasonably believed that [he] 
intended to impose harm.”); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“We look not only to [the student’s] actions, but to all of the circumstances confronting 
the school officials that might reasonably portend disruption.”); Latour v. Riverside Beaver 
Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A 05-1076, 2005 WL 2106562, at *2 (W.D. Pa Aug. 24, 2005); In re George 
T., 93 P.3d at 1017 (“[A] threat must ‘on its face and under the circumstances in which it is 
made, [be] so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey . . . a grav-
ity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.’”) (alterations in 
original) (emphasis omitted). 
269 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (1996); see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1006.09 (2003); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 18A:37-2 (West 1959). A school may suspend a student who is charged with a 
felony and expel a student who is convicted of a felony for an incident which occurred off 
campus if that incident is shown “to have an adverse impact on the educational program, 
discipline, or welfare in the school in which the student is enrolled.” § 1006.09. 
270 See supra note 268. 
271 See Libel Lessons, Vol. XXII, No. 1 Student Press Law Center 16 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=615&edition=17; see also Rutherford Insti-
tute, supra note 231, at 13. 
272 See Rutherford Institute supra note 231, at 13 (The public schools cannot be ex-
pected to cure all of America’s social ills.”). Contra Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 
F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2007). 
273 See Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 636 (McMillian, J., dissenting); supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Conclusion 
 At the moment, school officials face the daunting task of looking at 
a conflicting body of online student speech case law and trying to de-
velop effective policies for addressing students’ online expression. The 
proposed control and supervision test provides a simple solution to the 
question of when schools have jurisdiction over student online activity. 
This test is easily understood by students and administered by schools 
because it is a workable, non-geographic analysis, and it is consistent 
with the well-established standards for determining school responsibility 
and authority. This test also strikes a fair balance between a school’s in-
terest in providing a safe environment and the students’ and public’s 
interest in providing students with First Amendment speech rights. 
Moreover, this test provides fair notice to students of the boundary be-
tween school and home and, thus, minimizes the chilling of protected 
student speech. Finally, making the standard for a school’s authority 
over online speech equal to the standard for a school’s responsibility to 
protect its students avoids placing schools in a legal quandary by allow-
ing schools to regulate any speech that they have a legal obligation to 
address. 
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